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Background: Biosecurity are all precautionary measures put in place to ensure that 
biological materials are protected from being abused. The abuse means that these agents 
may be used to cause harm to humans, animals, agriculture and environment. All necessary 
safeguards are employed to ensure that the materials are not susceptible to theft, loss, 
diversion including intentional and unintentional release which can harm. The materials 
can either be in a research institution, hospital setting or during transport of highly 
infectious agents but not limited to laboratory setting. 
Methodology  
This study was a qualitative retrospective study which involved analysis of the data 
published online by WHO on country’s level of preparedness capacity in implementation 
of GHSA agenda. Eleven of the thirteen capacity areas related to biosecurity were extracted 
from the electronic state party self-assessment reporting tool as it is compulsory for every 
member to report yearly. The scores were compared between the countries and also with 







Two countries had 50% and above average score for 2018 namely Rwanda and Uganda 
while Kenya, Burundi and Tanzania had scores below the mark. For 2019, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Rwanda had scores above 50% of 52.9, 65.2 and 76.4 respectively. Kenya was 
the least prepared followed by Burundi by the end of year 2019. However, Kenya is more 
economically developed followed by Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi 
respectively. 
Conclusion 
 Political commitment to IHR (2005) was the greatest factor that contributed to the different 
levels of capacity attained by the countries followed by susceptibility to recurrent 
epidemics which necessitate national preparedness to rapidly and effectively respond 
whenever they occur. There was no observable relationship between the level of a country’s 





With the advent of COVID-19 and challenges thereof, there is no time in recent history that 
biosecurity has taken precedence in routine activities as now. The emerging and reemerging 
infectious diseases pose a significant public health risk that are haunting human civilization 
in the past several decades. These pathogens should be regarded as high threats to human, 
animals and environment. As witnessed in the year 2020, a virus from the family of 
coronaviridae called severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) that 
cause the coronavirus disease 19, and was reported first in Wuhan City, Hubei province of 
China,1 spread quickly across the world attaining the status of public health emergency of 
international concern (PHEIC). A short while after a PHEIC declaration, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) declared the disease as a pandemic. In this regard, many measures 
focusing on biosafety and biosecurity that focus on one health aspect of the disease 
outbreaks, and control of spread of it are of paramount importance. Furthermore, standard 
precautions and control measures should also be instituted at personal and community level 
to prevent the spread of contagious diseases.2 For instance, employers have devised 
methods of scheduling shifts of their workers, ensuring that the different groups do not 
come into contact with each other and maintaining social distancing during the shift to 
ensure biosecurity.3 Sometimes, biosecurity is misconstrued to mean only biological 
material in a laboratory set up. However, biosecurity covers a lot of spheres like in 
healthcare facilities of highly specialized clinics handling highly infectious diseases like 
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Viral hemorrhagic fever, SARS, MDR and XDR- tuberculosis and others hence requires a 
good understanding of its scope.4 
 Besides safeguarding human health, biosecurity is applied in many sectors of the economy 
and even others employ some preventive measures without knowing that what they are 
involved in is actually biosecurity. Cattle farmers for instance, have restricted access by 
strangers to their herds to control diseases. They also disinfect vehicles or equipment. 
Furthermore, they introduce foot wash for workers or anyone who is legible to access the 
area occupied by animals. This is observed before and after the visit. In the same regard, 
the farmers ensure that the animals that are to be introduced to the farm are of known health 
status. In this regard, farmers have banned introduction of new herds completely to their 
area hence preventing the introduction of diseases to their farms. Furthermore, these 
farmers ensure that proper vaccination is done to their animals to prevent diseases hence 
cut cost in having to treat their animals against some diseases. This promotes prevention of 
antimicrobial resistance that can be brought about by use of antimicrobials to treat vaccine 
preventable diseases.5 Similarly, biosecurity measures are applied in other types of 
livestock farming including but not limited to the largescale chicken farmers. For instance, 
the farmers in Australia employ biosafety measures to protect their livestock against highly 
pathogenic Avian Influenza.6 On the other hand, plant protection from various pests and 
other threats as covered by the international plant protection convention, and various 
organizations under FAO that are concerned with animal life and health, food safety, plant 
health including associated environmental risks, advocate for continuum integration of 
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various departments.  The departments are tasked with ensuring that no new biological 
agents that cause threats are introduced to their country through any activities that fall 
within their mandate. This  ensures  a fully integrated system.7 Though sometimes 
biosecurity definition seems ambiguous, the approaches may seem different but with 
similar goals.8 A lot of efforts is involved to ensure environmental protection hence foster 
sustainability.9   The departments of agriculture for instance has to make sure that any 
exotic crops introduced have been carefully examined before being allowed to be grown 
freely. Furthermore, they have to ensure that animals imported to the country are free from 
diseases and also do not carry insects which can infest other local animals. The customs 
department also has to ensure that the goods that are imported do not harbor hitch hikes 
that may constitute a breach to biosecurity for the country.  
Biosecurity in relation to Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), refers to application of 
biosecurity in safeguarding human and animal health from infectious diseases that pose 
danger globally due to the current world interconnectedness. The initiative was launched 
in February 2014 as these infectious diseases have had devastating human, security and 
economic impact at the country, regional and global level.  Global health security is a 
shared responsibility that cannot be achieved by a single actor or sector of government but 
rather depends upon the collaboration among health, security, trade, environmental and 
agricultural sectors. GHSA acknowledges the essential need for a multilateral and multi-
sectoral approach to strengthen both the global capacity and nations’ capacity to prevent, 
detect and respond to infectious threats.10 
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2.0 Literature Review 
 
Biosecurity is set of procedures designed and employed with a purpose of prevention or, 
reduction of generation or release of highly infectious biological organisms or toxin that 
can cause harm to human, livestock, agriculture or environment. Initially, this terminology 
was employed when dealing with highly infectious organisms with respect to biosafety 
level 3 or 4 laboratories. However, the scope has been widened to ensure that any infectious 
biological material whether on transit, in an isolation facility in a healthcare setting or 
laboratory is taken into consideration. It is also imperative to include the protection of 
relevant literature pertaining these infectious agents and toxins, research findings, 
equipment and processes from unauthorized access even from family members of the 
people working with such materials.11  
Mostly, in biosafety level 3 or 4 laboratories, the biosecurity component involves physical 
security of the facility including access control and security services. Material 
accountability and security including during handling and transportation is also covered. 
The other aspect is the scrutiny of the personnel. This encompasses identity verification of 
those with access to highly infectious organisms including measures to check on insider 
misuse of the biological materials. It also includes measures like ensuring that at least two 
people are working at the facility at any given time. Biosecurity sometimes employs access 
keys or passwords. This is gradually being overtaken by retinal recognition or thumb print 
unlocking mechanisms as the former were prone to theft. Furthermore, there is need to 
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ensure that the staff who work in biosecurity sector undergo psychological vetting to ensure 
that they are not people with distorted ideologies.12 
Biosecurity is a system that requires multidisciplinary approach as the various threats affect 
different areas of the ecosystem. This include environment, plants, animals and humans. 
As these fall in different dockets, specific organizations have to be tasked with the 
responsibility of protecting specific sectors from biological threats with a central 
organization to facilitate sharing of information as biosecurity requires a collective and 
integrated approach. For instance, the agriculture department is wary of introduction of 
new materials that may contain pathogens for the plants. This includes introduction of new 
plants from neighboring or other countries whose crops are affected by certain pathogens. 
Worth noting is the fact that, some plants introduced to a new environment can constitute 
a biosecurity threat. The plants may be invasive in their growth characteristic that may 
cause ecological imbalance constituting a biosecurity breach.  
The plants are also susceptible to attack by diseases and exotic pests which may be 
imported from other countries during trade or accidentally due to high movement of people 
and goods across the globe. The importation may also be intentional by people with hidden 
agenda to cause harm or economic sabotage. There is also a possibility of biota introduction 
which may negatively affect the new environment. The agriculture sector is also 
responsible in regulation of importation of animals and animal products. This calls for 
continued surveillance as some animals imported or plants which are legally traded may 
contain diseases that can cause biosecurity breaches.13 Animals can suffer from diseases 
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caused by imported microorganisms and also bovine spongiform encephalopathy for cows 
caused by prion.14 Genetic engineered organisms are also not spared in this aspect as their 
sustainability is not predictable in the long run.15  
With the current trend of emergence of highly infectious pathogens where small scale 
infections expand spontaneously putting pressure on existing infrastructure, it is incumbent 
that continuous knowledge and preparation is necessary to be at par with such challenges. 
Furthermore, there is need to ensure biosecurity amid these disasters to avert further 
exploitation by groups or individuals with questionable agenda. For instance, the emerging 
infectious diseases mostly attract treatment and prevention of spread in the population only. 
However, less effort is made to ensure that those patients isolated are not within reach of 
unauthorized individuals which constitutes a biosecurity threat. The specimens obtained 
from suspected cases must be properly secured in terms of transport, analysis and disposal 
so that they do not get diverted to illegal use. Furthermore, the publicity such epidemic 
events attract is so enormous that it is imperative for the administration to come up with 
mitigation measures to prevent access of specimen containing highly infectious materials 
from unauthorized access and use. The biological agents may access the country through 
illegal or legal means which requires continuous monitoring by various state agencies 
through which the activities take place. For instance, the activities may include 
globalization of trade, international travel for tourism or for other purposes, change in land 
uses, smuggling and bioterrorism to mention a few.  Biosecurity requires multi-sectoral 
approach, integrated and coordinated from a central command with the sole target of 
7 
 




This is the first priority for biosecurity and the most cost effective undertaking. All 
necessary measures should be employed to prevent introduction or spread of a harmful 
biological agent. This is important as for it is normally very difficult to fight some agents 
once they have been introduced in a population or environment. First, it requires time and 
resources to implement and may sometimes prove impossible to immediately identify the 
affected so that targeted treatment can be initiated. In some instances, it may require long 
term treatment which will put pressure on the resources available for such activities. 
Furthermore, the agent may be highly infectious that can spread to populations far and wide 
within a short time causing a humanitarian catastrophe. Prevention requires trained 
personnel and technologies packed by regulatory legislation and policies. These teams 
should have a collaboration leeway to work with other counterparts in other countries to 
ensure some of the threats are prevented from reaching the local area or population. 
Surveillance teams composed of technically competent staff with well-equipped 
laboratories are important in monitoring biological agents including zoonotic pathogens as 
they constitute 75% of the emerging infectious diseases in the last century.16 The laboratory 
should have good biosafety and biosecurity, proper specimen referral and transport system 
in addition to provision for priority disease testing. Prevention may also involve ensuring 
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that the country from which goods are imported have replica biosecurity guidelines for 
clearing the goods at the port of departure as for the importing country. 
 Early Detection. 
This is the second most important component of biosecurity. Once there is a lapse in 
prevention, the other second best opportunity to avoid large scale spread of a biological 
agent is early detection. This requires continued bio-surveillance so as to identify bio 
threats early. Various methods of surveillance are employed which are either indicator 
based or syndromic. Indicator based is more accurate like use of sentinel herds for zoonotic 
diseases like Rift Valley Fever (RVF) which involves monitoring the disease in small 
ruminant stock of sheep and goats. The disease is an epizoonotic type transmitted by Aedes 
genus and is maintained through transovarian route by the flood water mosquitoes.17  The 
other methods like utilizing the number of confirmed cases in the laboratory setting are also 
important. However, they are quite slow to generate and interpret while syndromic is fast 
to provide the necessary alert once the preset thresholds of public health events have been 
attained. Despite the robustness of syndromic surveillance, caution has to be taken when 
interpreting the signal for alert and requires epidemiologic interpretation to avoid 
generating false alarms.18 When effective detection mechanisms are in place, they make 
control easy as the area is small and the number total number of persons affected is small 




 Alertness and Rapid Response  
 
This is the third strategy for biosecurity. It is incumbent for the response teams to act 
quickly once they have been notified of existence of an infectious or dangerous biological 
agent. This calls for a standby command center to coordinate such activities with ready 
financial support. This is important as the effectiveness of containment, elimination or 
eradication depends on swiftness of the response teams. It is imperative to put strategies of 
obtaining surge capacity of human resource in case of a widened spread of a biological 
agent beyond the capability of the existing teams. There is need to identify the infected 
persons early and isolate them to prevent spread of the infection. Furthermore, it is 
imperative to carry out decontamination in time for bio-threats that require so while taking 
into consideration the five psychosocial aspects of incident management. These include 
likely public behavior, communication strategy, vulnerable groups, responder management 
style and privacy/modesty concern bearing in mind that, effective communication and 
respect for casualties’ needs are critical in ensuring that decontamination is completed 
quickly and effectively.19 In addition, there is urgency of identifying their close contacts by 
contact tracing and quarantining awaiting investigation. This is important as some of the 
emerging infectious diseases can be spread by asymptomatic carriers and due to long 
incubation period of some of these agents, it may lead to a great number of cases that may 
overwhelm the health system.20 Moreover, the inflow of data containing information 
pertaining a public health threat is enormous during such occasions. This in itself is 
disastrous to the responding agency as it is unstructured. There must be robust filtering of 
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this information, and effective communication strategy to ensure the information passed to 
the public by authorities is accurate and most current as possible. With the current state of 
social media platforms that provide alternative communication channels to the public, it is 
imperative that social media provides an opportunity for real time information that can be 
harnessed by authorities.  When this information is taken into consideration by the 
authorities, it can help in prevention of a bottom up communication hence relieving 
pressure on the government authorities.21 The attributes of effective risk communication 
play a critical role at this stage. The communicating authority must strive to be right, to be 
first, build trust, to show empathy and demonstrate action hence command the public 
confidence as the sole source of credible information. 
For effective prevention, detection and early rapid response against highly infectious 
biological agents, the crosscutting issues for these main activities must be addressed. These 
activities rely heavily on multidisciplinary well trained teams, detailed policies and relevant 
legislative framework, coordination and partnership among stakeholders, easy access to up 
to date information and public support. They also should have support of a good 
information communication technology system with research and management findings, 
curated specimen collections and standardized databases which are easily accessible for 
efficient delivery of their mandate. On the other hand, there must be commensurate increase 
in staffing of these sectors, and training them to acquire specific competencies. Steps 
should be taken to ensure that jurisdictional challenges and conflicts are addressed for 
harmonious coordination of their activities.22  Despite constituting all the necessary teams, 
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it is imperative to carry out simulation exercises to test the operability of these systems. 
Minor table top exercises like the insider exercise, decision making exercises and large-
scale national simulation exercise is handy in coming up with ways of improving the 
preparedness. In a research carried out by European Union (EU) AniBio Threat between 
2010 and 2013 to improve capacity to counter animal bio-threats in terms of awareness, 
prevention and contingency, carrying out demonstration exercises against bio-threats 
identified gaps and opportunities for improvement. These included areas like legal matters, 
coordinated decision making, situation awareness, complexity of sharing information 
concerning diseases and crime investigation, and also challenges of fostering a holistic 
mindset and collaborative culture. The findings led to the recommendation by the research 
team that national multi-sectoral simulation exercise is critical for effective prevention and 
response to biological threats and other biological threat reduction actions.23 
 
 
2.1 Problem statement 
 
Despite various emphasis put in biosecurity in different fora, most countries lag behind in 
instituting various mechanisms and measures as stipulated in international treaties. 
Sometimes, the failure by countries may not be attributed to lack of resources but lack of 
recognition that, some of those recommended steps can be achieved with minimum or not 
much of resources required at all beyond the country’s capability. The current SAR-CoV-
2 pandemic has demonstrated glaring weaknesses in biosecurity preparedness, detection 
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and response across the globe and has been termed a world war in some quarters.24 The 
research sought to look at various aspects of biosecurity in the five countries of East Africa. 
This was meant to identify biosecurity discrepancies within them as these countries have 
common trade agreements. These agreements allows free movement of people and goods 
within their borders. The relaxed trade regulations means that a biosecurity threat in one 
country is a threat to its trade partners hence the optimum biosecurity across the block 
depends on the least level attained by one of the members.   This is the basis of this research 
to demonstrate that some of what seems challenging can be overcome without much input. 






The following were the objectives of the research: 
 To find out the status of biosecurity preparedness of East Africa countries. 
 To find out how East African countries’ score compare with Region’s average 







3.1 Study design 
  
This study was a qualitative retrospective study which involved analysis of data published 
online by WHO on country’s level of capacity preparedness in implementation of GHSA 
agenda and also data from World Bank reports on gross domestic product (GDP). The five 
Eat African countries underwent the Joint External Evaluation which was based on the 
nineteen technical areas with 48 indicators. A technical area consisted between one and 
five indicators. However, Electronic State Party self-assessment Annual Reporting tool (e-
SPAR), whose data was used in this study is based on 13 capacity areas with 24 indicators. 
This capacity areas were drawn from the nineteen technical areas covered under the JEE. 
A capacity area has between one and three indicators on which it is assessed and the score 
is between 1 and 5 for each indicator which is converted into a percentage. The capacity 
score is the average percentage score for the total indicators under it. 
 Eleven of the thirteen capacity areas related to biosecurity were extracted from the 
electronic state party self-assessment reporting tool as it is compulsory for every member 
to report annually. The capacities considered were Legislation and Financing, IHR 
coordination and National IHR focal point functions, Zoonotic events and Human-animal 
interface, Food Safety, Risk Communication, Laboratory, Capacity in Health service 
provision, Surveillance, National Health Emergency Framework, Human Resources and 
Point of entry capacity. The 2018 and 2019 scores were compared against the WHO Africa 
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region’s average and also the difference between the countries. The change for capacity 
scores in 2019 were compared for each country from the previous year to check 
improvement and the least and most improved countries were identified. The total average 
score was also compared to the international score to find out how far it was from the 50% 
level.  The variables were presented in a 100% scale depicting the level of preparedness 
which are very poor for 19 points and below, poor for above 20 and 39 points, average 
above 40 and 59 points, good representing above 60 and 79 points while very good ranges 
from above 80 points to 100 in relation to internationally recognized criteria. The data was 
extracted and presented in charts. 
3.2 Study Population 
 
The study involved all the East African countries that underwent joint external evaluation 
(JEE) and submitted their reports to WHO by electronic state parties self-assessment annual 




3.3 Inclusion Criteria. 
 
All East African countries who are state parties to international health regulation (IHR) and 
had submitted their country’s Joint External Evaluation report to WHO. The country also 
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must have filed yearly reports using the electronic state parties’ self-assessment tool. All 
eleven of the thirteen capacity areas covered by e-SPAR which are related to biosecurity 
were included in this study. 
 
3.4 Data management and analysis  
 
Data was collected from the East African countries reports which were published by WHO 
January 2016 and December 2019 and was stored in a computer. The variables of interest 
were capacities in Legislation and Financing, IHR coordination and National IHR focal 
point functions, Zoonotic events and Human-animal interface, Food Safety, Risk 
Communication, Laboratory, Capacity in Health service provision, Surveillance, National 
Health Emergency Framework, Human Resources and Point of entry capacity. The e-SPAR 
data was used as it is compulsory and was disaggregated for 2018 and 2019. The 




There exists no relationship between the level of biosecurity preparedness and the 






The following charts show the percentage capacity levels of the eleven of the thirteen 
GHSA agenda related to biosecurity. 
 
Figure 1.  Average percentage score in Legislation and financing 
. 
Burundi had the lowest score of 7% while Kenya and Uganda followed with 20% and 47% 
respectively. Tanzania had 53% while Rwanda led in this category by 93% for year 2018. 
The same trend was maintained in year 2019. However, the most improved country was 
Burundi which experienced an increase of 26% while Kenya and Uganda followed with 
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previous years’ score. Despite the tremendous improvement by the two countries which 
had their average below the WHO Africa regions’ average of 41% in 2018, still they were 
not able to reach the region’s average for 2019 missing the 43% mark by an average of 3% 
and 10% for Kenya and Burundi respectively. Only two countries had an average of 50% 
and above in 2018 but were three in 2019 after Uganda experienced an increased score to 
53% reaching the same mark with Tanzania. The Africa WHO region average also 







Figure 2 Average capacity in IHR coordination and National focal point. 
  
Kenya and Burundi attained a score below the African regions’ average of 47% missing 
the mark by 27% and 17% respectively for 2018. On the other hand, in 2019 three countries 
namely Kenya, Uganda and Burundi failed to attain the WHO African region average score 
of 51%. Their differences with the score were 21% for Kenya while Uganda and Burundi 
missed the mark by 1% each. Rwanda was leading with 90% while Tanzania followed by 
60%. The countries that experienced improvement were Kenya and Burundi with an 
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50% and above except Kenya in 2019. There was a general increase in the average score 










Figure 3. Average capacity in Zoonotic events and Human-animal interface. 
 
Burundi and Uganda had scores of 20% and 40% respectively which were below the WHO 
Africa region’s   average score of 51% for 2018 while Tanzania did not report. Kenya had 
a score of 60% while Rwanda was leading with 80% which was maintained in the following 
year. In 2019, all countries had a score of 60% apart from Rwanda which had 80%. All 
countries exceeded the WHO Africa region’s average which stood at 50%. The country 
with most improvement from 2018 was Burundi which saw an increase of 40%while 
Uganda had an increase of 20%. The general region’s average for this parameter dropped 
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Figure 4. Average capacity in food safety 
 
Uganda and Kenya had 20% each and did not attain the WHO Africa region’s average of 
40% in 2018. For 2019, only Uganda and Burundi failed to reach the African region’s 
average of 43% by a margin of 3%. The most improved country was Kenya by a margin of 
40% followed by Uganda and Rwanda with 20% each while Tanzania and Burundi had no 
change from their previous year’s score. To sum up, there were two countries namely 
Tanzania and Rwanda that had a score above 50% in 2018 while in 2019 they were three 
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Figure 5. Laboratory Capacity 
 
Kenya, Tanzania and Burundi failed to reach the WHO Africa region’s target for 2018 0f 
54% with scores of 53% each for Kenya and Tanzania while Burundi had 40%. Uganda 
and Rwanda had 87 and 93% respectively. In 2019, all countries attained a score more than 
the region’s average of 56% except Tanzania which maintained the previous year’s score 
of 53 hence missing the regions average by 3%. The countries which experienced 
improvement in score for 2019 were Kenya and Burundi which had an increase of 7 and 
20% respectively. The leading country was Rwanda at 93% followed by Uganda with 87%. 
All countries had more than 50% score in 2019 unlike in 2018 whereby one country had a 
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Figure 6. Average capacity in surveillance. 
 
Tanzania had the least score of 40% followed by Kenya and Burundi with 50% each. The 
three countries did not meet the Africa region’s average of 59% for the year 2018. In 2019 
only Burundi experienced improvement from the previous year’s score by 20% to be at par 
with Rwanda at 70% while other countries maintained their previous scores. Only Tanzania 
and Kenya failed to reach the year’s region average of 61% as they maintained their 
previous year’s score of 40 and 50% respectively. Uganda was leading with 80%. For the 
two years under consideration, only Tanzania failed to reach 50% capacity for the two years 
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Figure 7.  Average Capacity in Human Resources  
 
Kenya and Tanzania had a score of 20% each while Rwanda and Burundi had 40% each in 
the same period which was below the African region’s average of 49%. However, Uganda 
exceeded the 2018 average by 31% scoring 80%. In 2019, only Kenya and Tanzania failed 
to reach the year’s Africa average score of 49% scoring 20 and 40% respectively. There 
was improvement in scores for Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi by 20% each. Only 
Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda had a score of 50% and above in 2019. Uganda was leading 
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Figure 8. Average capacity in National Health Emergency Network  
 
Burundi had the least score at 13% followed by Kenya with 33%. Rwanda and Tanzania 
followed with 40 and 47% respectively while Uganda was leading with 67% for year 2018. 
Only Burundi and Kenya failed to meet the region’s average of 36% for the year. In 2019, 
all countries experienced an increase in score from what they had in the previous year 
except Kenya which had no change. Burundi had an increase of 17% followed by Uganda 
with an increase of 13%, Rwanda had 7% increase while Tanzania had 7%. By the end of 
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Figure 9. Average Capacity in Health Service Provision 
 
Burundi and Kenya did not meet the average of African region score of 39% for 2018. They 
scored 27 and 33% respectively. Tanzania had 40, Uganda 53% while Rwanda was leading 
with 67%. In 2019, Kenya and Burundi had a score of 40% each while Uganda and 
Tanzania had 53% each. Rwanda maintained the previous year’s score of 67%. The country 
with the greatest increase in score was Uganda by 14% followed by Tanzania and Burundi 




















Kenya Uganda Tanzania Rwanda Burundi Regional Average
score 2018 score 2019
27 
 
score above 50% namely Uganda and Rwanda in 2018 while in 2019 the number increased 











Figure 10. Average Capacity in Risk Communication 
 
Burundi and Kenya failed to reach the African region’s score for 2018 of 39% by scoring 
20% each. Uganda did not report while Tanzania and Rwanda had 60 and 100% score 
respectively. In 2019, Kenya and Burundi experienced an increase of 20% from what they 
had previously reaching 40%. Uganda reported 80% while Tanzania and Rwanda 
maintained their previous scores of 60 and 100% respectively. Despite the increase 
experienced by Kenya and Burundi, they both failed to reach the African region’s average 
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Figure 11. Average Capacity at Points of Entry 
 
Two countries namely Burundi and Uganda did not reach the WHO African region’s 
average for 2018 which was 31%. They had a score of 10 and 20% respectively. The other 
three countries had a same score of 40% in 2018. In 2019, all countries surpassed the 
African regions average which was 36%. Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi had a score of 40% 
each while Kenya and Tanzania had 50% each. Burundi had the greatest improvement by 
30% followed by Uganda by 20% while Kenya and Tanzania experienced the same 
improvement of 10%. Rwanda had no change in scores from the previous year. No country 
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Figure 12. Average scores for the 11 capacity areas for the year 2018 and 2019 
 
There was an increase in preparedness in 2019 from the previous year. Burundi experienced 
the greatest improvement from a figure which was 17.2% lower than the WHO African 
region’s average of 44.2% for 2018 to 0.9% above the average for 2019 which was 46.6%. 
Kenya was second in improvement and had an increase of 11.3% but failed to reach the 
African region’s average by 1.8%. Uganda was third in improvement and exceeded the 
African region’s average for 2019 by 18.6% unlike 10.2 the previous year. Tanzania had a 










Kenya Uganda Tanzania Rwanda Burundi Africa region
average
Average score 2018 Average score 2019
33 
 
by 6.3%. The country which experienced the least improvement was Rwanda despite being 
the leading in average score and had an increase of 4.3% from the previous year’s score. 
Rwanda exceeds the African region’s average by 29.8%. Despite the observed 
improvement, only Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda had scores above 50% in 2019 of 52.9, 










Figure 13. Showing the GDP for the east African countries for 2018 and 2019 
(million USD). 
 
Kenya has the greatest GDP followed by Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi 
respectively. There was an increase in GDP for the year 2019 from the previous year for 
all countries except Burundi which had a decline. Kenya was leading in Increase followed 



























The findings indicate that Rwanda was a head of the rest in six capacity areas besides the 
capacity on Health Service provision in which the score was equal with that for Uganda. 
The six capacity areas were Legislation and Financing, IHR coordination and National IHR 
focal point functions, Zoonotic events and Human-animal interface, Food Safety, Risk 
Communication, and Laboratory. Uganda was second, leading in three of the eleven 
capacity areas excluding the capacity in Health service provision. The three capacity areas 
were Surveillance, National Health Emergency Framework and Human Resources. 
Tanzania and Kenya were leading on Point of entry capacity. In average performance for 
2018, Rwanda was leading followed by Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Burundi in 
descending order. For 2019, the order for 2018 was maintained only for Burundi to 
interchange positions with Kenya though with improvement in the average score for all 
countries. In a study conducted in 2015 to assess the implementation of IHR 2005 
capacities or their components, in which 51 articles were analyzed from 77 countries 
representing all WHO regions, 44 lessons were learnt from the eight capacity areas which 
were considered. The major themes were to mobilize and sustain political commitment to 
adapt global requirements based on local social-cultural, epidemiological, health system 
and economic contexts and also conduct baseline and follow-up assessment, and to monitor 
the status of IHR implementation.25 In another study, it was found that centralized political, 
technical and fiscal authority is key to developing a robust sustainable and integrated health 
security across government.26 For instance, a study conducted in Rwanda aimed at 
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assessing the level of strengthening communicable diseases surveillance and targeting the 
laboratory network found that, success was due to a structured governing framework for 
public health surveillance, political commitment to promote strong leadership for stronger 
laboratory capacities, defined roles and responsibilities for each level, coordinated 
approaches between technical and funding partners, coordination with external laboratories 
and use of performance results in advocacy with national stakeholders.22 
Exposure to recurrent epidemics also played an important role in achievement of success 
in IHR capacities. For instance, Uganda is an ecological spot with infectious diseases 
transmission belts which exacerbates its vulnerability to epidemics. Its proximity to the 
Congo basin, climate change pressure systems, increased international travel and 
globalization, and influx of refugees due to the porous borders which worsens the problem. 
Due to these, the country developed a multi-hazard plan with the purpose of harmonizing 
processes and guiding stakeholders on strengthening emergency preparedness and 
response.27 On the same note, in 2010, collaboration between Uganda Virus Research 
Institute and the Health  Ministry on one hand, and US Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s Viral Special Pathogen Branch on the other, established Uganda’s National 
viral Hemorrhagic fever surveillance and laboratory program to enhance Uganda’s 
Integrated Disease Surveillance and Reporting (IDSR) to rapidly detect, diagnose, report, 
and respond to viral hemorrhagic fever as well as other emerging infectious zoonotic 
diseases.28 To highlight this, similar studies have shown more preparedness in the way 
countries affected by epidemics build more prepared systems for future public health 
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emergencies. For instance,  South Korea has effectively responded to COVID-19 due to 
improved system preparedness due to the disastrous MERS outbreak in 2015.29 In a similar 
manner, the Chinese government realized the importance of addressing microbial threats 
like severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) hence committed substantial resources in 
disease surveillance30. Furthermore, it has been recognized that, national security is not 
only a protection of the country from state and non-state actors, but also encompasses 
protection from emerging infectious diseases and other health outcomes that can threaten 
the nation’s economic vitality and its very way of life.31 In a study conducted in 2017 to 
assess the importance of public health legal preparedness, it was established that having 
laws is important in achieving set targets. It prioritizes planning, allocates responsibility, 
enhances collaboration and coordination, and also establishes responsive funding.32 
However, legislation and policy depend on political will indicating that political 
commitment provides a critical component to the success of IHR.33 Finally, one could 
expect more economically stable countries to be more prepared but that was not the case. 
Kenya, which is the biggest economy of the five countries was least prepared followed by 
Burundi which has the lowest economy of the five countries. Tanzania was third in level 
of preparedness while it is the second biggest economy after Kenya. Uganda which is third 
in the level of economy was second in biosecurity preparedness while Rwanda which is the 






The levels of biosecurity preparedness varies greatly within East African countries as the 
process of designing and implementation of various capacity areas requires financial and 
technical strategies. Rwanda and Uganda are most prepared compared to Tanzania, 
Burundi and Kenya. The success is mainly due to political commitment to attainment of 
capacity in IHR (2005). Recurrent epidemics also contributed positively to Uganda’s level 
of preparedness. There was no relationship between the countries’ economic status and 




The study used secondary data which may contain errors. Furthermore, the data was general 
but not disaggregated to show to what degree the various components of biosecurity 
contributed to the final score. The data relies on individual country’s assessment hence may 





There is need for sustained campaigns for political commitment in Global Health Security 
Agenda to ensure a safer world which is better prepared to tackle public health threats. 
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Furthermore, there is need for more detailed research to be conducted to find out the degree 
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